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COULD HE GO FASTER THAN HE COULD?
RUMINATIONS ON THE TIME LAPSE FROM
ORAL ARGUMENT TO OPINION FILING IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
WILLIAM H. ADKINS, II*
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter V of The Antiquary,' Jonathan Oldbuck of
Monkbarns, the antiquary of the title, dispatches Caxon, an ancient
messenger, with an important missive directed to Monkbarns's
neighbor, Sir Arthur Wardour of Knockwinnock. Monkbarns urges
the aged Mercury to " '[g]o as fast as if the town-council were met
and waiting for the provost, and the provost was waiting for his new-
powdered wig.' "2 But Caxon does not speed on his mission. We
are told,
He hobbled-but his heart was good!
Could he go faster than he could?'
That is a good question. If "could" denotes physical ability, the
answer must be in the negative. Obviously, no one can go faster
than he or she is physically capable of going. Even so, in some cases
physical ability can be improved by exercise, and speed enhanced by
application of appropriate techniques. And if we assume that
"could" contains within it some notion of psychological attitude--of
will-the answer changes. Now the proper reply is that one may go
as quickly as one wishes to go subject only to the limits of physical
ability.
The thesis of this Essay is that the time lapse from oral argu-
ment to opinion filing in the Court of Appeals of Maryland is, as a
general proposition, too long. I further submit that this unneces-
sary delay is not the result of "physical" inability to move more rap-
idly. The problem, instead, is one of "will." The court's record,
therefore, is susceptible of improvement.
* A.B., Williams College, 1949; LL.B., Harvard University, 1952. The author
served for nine years as Maryland State Court Administrator, four as an associate judge
of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and four as a judge of the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. He retired from the court on August 31, 1990.
1. SIR WALTER Scorr, THE ANTIQUARY (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1857).
2. 1 id. at 71.
3. 1 id. at 72.
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Let me make clear at the outset that I understand that an appel-
late court-especially the highest court of a state-cannot and
should not turn out opinions the way an automobile factory turns
out production-line vehicles. Cases are not fungible; each must be
examined in the context of its own facts. The law must be meticu-
lously researched, and there must be adequate time for reflection on
the ramifications of a decision, one way or another. Further, the
opinion itself requires careful drafting so that the pertinent facts,
the procedural posture of the case, the decision, and the rationale
are clearly expressed. And once the opinion writer has done all this,
there still must be reasonable time within which the draft can
be distributed to other members of the court, studied by them, and
discussed around the collegial conference table. Revisions may be
needed-perhaps even a dissent or concurrence will be
forthcoming.
Beyond these concerns, I am also aware that once a case has
been argued and the opinion assigned, all else does not come to a
halt until the opinion has been approved. There are, for example,
other briefs to read, arguments to hear, and opinions to write and to
study. Additionally, certiorari petitions must be reviewed, rule pro-
posals considered, and bar admission ceremonies performed.4
But having conceded all this, I continue to believe that the
opinion-preparation pace of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is
unduly deliberate. "Justice delayed is justice denied" is a clich6 we
are often fond of repeating. It is hard for a litigant who has waited a
year or more for a judgment in the circuit court5 and some 250 days
for a decision in the Court of Special Appeals6 to have to wait more
than 315 additional days for the Court of Appeals' decision. 7 It is
easy enough to give innumerable specific illustrations of the ways
that undue delay harms individual litigants, public policy implemen-
tation, and the internal operating practices of the court itself. But
for our purposes it suffices to note that
4. The tasks listed are illustrative only; the enumeration is far from an exhaustive
one.
5. In fiscal year 1990 the average elapsed time from filing to disposition of a civil
case in a circuit court was 364 days. 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 60. And while
two-thirds of the cases were disposed of in less than 361 days, almost 15% of the cases
remained undisposed of after 721 days and about 7% after 1081 days. Id.
6. The averages, in fiscal year 1990, were 104 days from disposition in a circuit
court to docketing in the Court of Special Appeals, 138 days from docketing to argu-
ment, and 28 days from argument to decision by the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 35.
7. Id. at 26. In fiscal year 1990, the time from argument to decision comprised 226
days of this 315 day average. Id.
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[c]ourt delay is much more than a statistical curiosity, a
popular topic of the media, or a seemingly mandatory
agenda item at many professional conferences. Litigation
may alter permanently the lives of the parties directly in-
volved as well as those of other members of society. Appel-
late courts often determine irrevocably whether a person
will be compensated for injury or loss, or released from
confinement or continued in incarceration. These courts
may help to determine the direction and scope of impor-
tant public policy. When the resolution of appeals is
delayed, lives may be disrupted while individuals and soci-
ety, unable because of the delay to plan confidently for the
future, await the final disposition of cases.... [I]t is gener-
ally agreed that court delay compromises the quality ofjus-
tice. This conclusion is based, implicitly, on the premise
that the speedy resolution of controversies is a fundamen-
tal societal goal which, with alarming frequency, is not
being met by the courts.8
There is really no need to enlarge upon the unfortunate situa-
tions that delay may cause. They are many and readily perceptible.
No one, I suspect, will argue that undue delay is desirable. The
questions are whether the delay that exists is "undue," and if so,
what can be done about it. In other words, could we go faster if we
would, and how do we produce the will to do so? It is to these ques-
tions that I now turn, and I do so in the specific context of the time
lapse from the oral argument of a case to the filing of the opinion in
that case. 9
8. JOHN A. MARTIN & ELIZABETH A. PRESCOTr, APPELLATE COURT DELAY 1 (1981); see
also, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL.,JUSTICE ON APPEAL 137 (1976); ROBERT A. LEFLAR,
INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 9 (1976). Out of compassion
for the reader, I omit citations to the numerous reports of committees and commissions
in Maryland that contain similar views. See generally THOMAS B. MARVELL, BIBLIOGRAPHY:
STATE APPELLATE COURT WORKLOAD AND DELAY (1979).
9. It is tempting to look at the problem in the context of the total time lapse from
noting an appeal (filing of certiorari petition) to ultimate disposition of the case. This
aggregate time period is, after all, the sum total of appellate "delay." Moreover, many
states compile statistics on this time period, thus permitting extensive comparison with
Maryland's experiences. By some standards, Maryland is quite slow if this time period is
used. Compare 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 26 (315 days from granting of certio-
rari to decision) with AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
DELAY REDUCTION § 3.52(b) (1988) (proposing 280 day limit from notice of appeal to
issuance of opinion). But discussion of this more extensive time period would distract
attention from the critical argument-to-opinion period over which judges have exclusive
control. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland, this time period occupies the bulk of
appellate processing time: 226 out of 315 days in fiscal year 1990. See supra note 7.
Furthermore, it is the latter time period that is of great concern to the bar. Even as long
ago as 1982, it was noted that "[w]ith respect to the Court of Appeals, the problem
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I. How QUICKLY (OR SLOWLY) IS THE COURT GOING?
The Maryland Judiciary's Annual Reports for fiscal years 1987
through 1990, inclusive, reveal that the time lapse from oral argu-
ment or submission to decision averaged about seventy percent of
the total time from grant of certiorari to filing of the opinion.1 0 In
other words, almost three-quarters of the appellate processing time
involved the preparation of the decision. Further details are dis-
played in Table 1.
TABLE 1"
Time From
Argument To
Days From Days From Grant Decision As
Fiscal Argument To of Certiorari To Percent of Overall
Year Decision Decision Time
1990 226 315 72% 12
1989 256 356 727 13
1988 217 295 74% 14
1987 160 253 637 15
How do these numbers compare with those in other states? It
is difficult to tell without extensive further research because few
states publish statistics comparable to those given above.' 6 More-
over, any comparison of time lapse figures without detailed analyses
of procedural requirements, caseload, opinion load, and other fac-
tors, is likely to be somewhat flawed. Nevertheless, in the spring of
1990, in an effort to obtain some pertinent data, I wrote to the state
appears to be the elapsed time from argument to decision." MARYLAND STATE BAR Asso-
CIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
15 (1982).
10. See 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 6; 1988-1989 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY
19; 1987-1988 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 19.
11. Table 1 is based on all cases argued to or submitted to the court-including per
curiam decisions and those dismissed by order on the day of argument or shortly
thereafter.
12. 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 26.
13. 1988-1989 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 19.
14. 1987-1988 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 19.
15. 1986-1987 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 27.
16. In the spring of 1990, the Information Service of the National Center for State
Courts advised that it had virtually no relevant comparable figures. See Letter from Ken-
neth G. Pankey, Jr., Staff Attorney, National Center for State Courts, to author (Apr. 9,
1990). Copies of all letters referenced in this article are on file with the Maryland Law
Review.
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court administrator in each state employing a two-tier appellate
structure roughly similar to Maryland's. 7 The information supplied
in responses reflects an interesting disparity in -time of delay be-
tween the various states and Maryland.
Although all of the time figures were better than those of Mary-
land, the states can be roughly divided into two categories: those
with delays of more than approximately 150 days and those with less
extensive delays. In considering the comparisons, it is important to
note that, in fiscal year 1990, the Court of Appeals of Maryland filed
142 majority opinions."8
In fiscal year 1989, 166 or 167 civil cases were considered by
the Supreme Court of Alaska, with an average time lapse of 185 days
from argument or submission to "publication."' 9 During the first
nine months of fiscal year 1990, 189 civil cases were considered with
an average of a 207 day delay.2 ° The Supreme Court of Michigan is
even less expeditious. "[I]t normally takes an average of nine to
twelve months after argument before an opinion of this court is re-
leased. That average has remained fairly constant over the last dec-
ade. 1 2 ' New Jersey's Supreme Court, another court with extensive
delay, filed 73 majority opinions in fiscal year 1989. The average
time from argument to decision was 206 days.2 The Supreme
Court of Washington in calendar year 1989 showed a median of 150
days from argument to filing of the opinion in civil matters (84
cases) and a median of 166 days in criminal matters (33 cases). The
figures for 1988 were 142 days for 77 civil cases and 141 days for 35
criminal cases.23
In contrast, many states have managed to file opinions in a
timely fashion. Hawaii, which averages between 300 and 400 opin-
17. Thirty-six surveys were sent out, 34 were returned, and 11 contained useful in-
formation for purposes of comparison to the information available in Maryland. The 36
states that received surveys are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
18. 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 23.
19. 1989 ALAsKA ANN. REP. 231-32.
20. Letter from David A. Lampen, Sr., Clerk, Supreme Court of Alaska, to author
(May 21, 1990).
21. Letter from Corbin R. Davis, Clerk, Michigan Supreme Court, to author (May 10,
1990).
22. Letter from Robert D. Lipscher, Administrative Director, Administrative Office
of the Courts, State of New Jersey, to author (May 30, 1990).
23. Letter from Brett Maurer, Research Specialist, Office of the Administrator for
the Courts, State of Washington, to author (May 24, 1990).
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ions per year in the Supreme Court, including unpublished memo-
randum opinions, shows reasonable diligence in issuing opinions.
Both the intermediate court of appeals and the Supreme Court
"normally issue [opinions] within 3 months after oral argument." 24
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has also exhibited rel-
ative speed. In fiscal year 1989, on average, 90 percent of its 222
full opinions were filed within 101 days of argument if there was no
dissent or concurrence, and 90 percent within 145 days if there was
a dissent or concurrence. Figures for earlier fiscal years back
through fiscal year 1987 (247 full opinions) are comparable. 25
During fiscal year 1989, the Supreme Court of Missouri dis-
posed of 136 cases by opinion or order. With respect to appeals
other than writs-including 15 death penalty cases-the average
time from submission to opinion was 107 days in criminal cases and
70 days in civil cases, for an overall average of 75 days. 26 The
Supreme Court of New Mexico reported an average time of 81.80
days from submission to decision in fiscal year 1989, with 171 opin-
ions considered. 27 This is a marked improvement over time statis-
tics for the two previous fiscal years, which were 113.95 days and
202.50 days, respectively.28
The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered 141 cases in
fiscal year 1989. The average opinion processing time from argu-
ment to the filing of the opinion was 99.40 days.29 The Supreme
Court of the Commonwealth of Virginia considered 215 cases in
1989, yet turned in the best performance recorded. "The time lapse
between argument and the handing down of decisions... [was] ap-
proximately six weeks." ° Although the pertinent figures in the
Idaho Supreme Court are confidential, in 1989, with 148 opinions
considered, the time lapse from argument to filing was substantially
24. Letter from Matthew Goodbody, Staff Attorney, Supreme Court of Hawaii, to
author (May 3, 1990). This figure is especially impressive considering that only about
half of the cases are granted any oral argument. Id.
25. Letter from Hon. Arthur M. Mason, Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial
Courts, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to author (May 29, 1990).
26. Letter from Jane Hess, Adiministrator, Office of State Court Administrator, State
of Missouri, to author (June 26, 1990).
27. 1989 NEW MEXICO CTs. ANN. REP. 12, 15.
28. Id.
29. Letter from Franklin Freeman, Jr., Director, Administrative Office of the Courts
of North Carolina, to author (May 22, 1990).
30. Letter from Robert M. Baldwin, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court of Virginia,
to author (Apr. 27, 1990).
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less than in Maryland. The same is true for 1988, 1987, and 1986."'
These data may be read to indicate that with the possible excep-
tion of Michigan and New Jersey (the latter state being only mini-
mally more expeditious than Maryland), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland takes longer from argument to opinion filing than does
any state's highest court for which I was able to obtain roughly com-
parable data. Of course, the data come from only eleven of the
thirty-four states that responded to my inquiry. Because of the
modest amount of pertinent data collected, and because of the diffi-
culties of comparison previously mentioned, it cannot be said that
these data prove anything conclusively. Still, they do at least hint
that the Court of Appeals of Maryland may be somewhat laggard in
filing opinions. Other signs point to the same conclusion.
For example, the Supreme Court of the United States generally
decides all cases argued during a term by the time it rises at the end
of that term. Practically speaking, the term is a period extending
from the first Monday in October in one year to late June in the
next-a period of about nine months, or 270 days. Obviously, all
the cases in a term are not argued in October, nor are all decisions
held until the end of June. As a consequence, the average time
lapse from argument to filing is bound to be well under 270 days.
The Supreme Court filed 142 opinions during the 1987 Term, 2 143
opinions in the 1988 Term s3 and 139 opinions in the 1989 Term.34
Thus, the Supreme Court, with its remarkable workload, seems to
dispose of its cases more rapidly than does the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
In addition, the American Bar Association (ABA) has promul-
gated standards that suggest the Maryland pace is unduly deliberate.
The ABA recommends a period of 120 to 150 days from argument
to filing of the decision.3 5 This standard is far more generous than
the 90 days proposed by the Maryland Constitution, 6 yet the Court
of Appeals does not even come close to meeting it.3 7
The evidence of laggardliness contained in Table 1, however, is
31. Letter from John R. Peay, Assistant Director, Administrative Office of the Courts,
State of Idaho, to author (Apr. 26, 1990).
32. The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REv. 143, 350 (1988).
33. The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 394 (1989).
34. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 359 (1991).
35. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY REDUC-
TION § 3.55(a)(3) (1988); see infra note 77.
36. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 15.
37. The Maryland constitutional provision is directory, not mandatory. See McCall's
Ferry Power Co. v. Price, 108 Md. 96, 113, 69 A. 832, 838 (1908).
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only part of the story. It is based on statistics published by the
Maryland Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), but these
totals include figures of all cases that are argued or submitted. For
example, if a case is dismissed on the day of argument because certi-
orari was improvidently granted, the AOC data reflects that quick
action. It also reflects other instances in which disposition of a case
occurs quite rapidly. When one examines only cases disposed of by
signed opinions, however, a much more dismal picture appears. It
is a picture that portrays a substantial difference among the per-
formances of individual judges, a fact masked by the AOC statistics.
Table 2 gives data on individual judges, compiled for fiscal years
1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990.38
This table makes apparent the great disparity in time taken by
individual judges to prepare opinions. A look at the data for Judges
A, B, C, E, G, and I---each of whom were on the court for all four
fiscal years studied-shows that Judges C, E, and I were consistently
quicker in filing opinions than Judges A, B, and G. The rate does
not correlate positively with the number of opinions written. Judge
A, one of the slower writers, produced fewer signed opinions over
the four-year period than did any other of the six judges who served
for all four years. Judge C, one of the more rapid, filed more signed
opinions than any of the six judges.
As the individual figures also demonstrate, the whole court's
average elapsed-time figures somewhat mask the delay that may oc-
cur in specific cases. On occasion, two years or more may pass be-
tween argument and filing. According to data compiled by the
Clerk's Office, there were seventy-nine unfiled opinions as of Octo-
ber 1, 1987. Almost sixty-two percent of these had been argued six
months or more before that date.39 The cumulative backlog that
38. The figures in Table 2 were compiled under the author's supervision during his
tenure on the bench. They include only signed opinions. For purposes of Table 2, a
judge is treated as on the court for the entire fiscal year if he was a member of the court
at the end of the fiscal year and had served continuously since prior to the beginning of
the Term of Court that commenced during that fiscal year. Table 2 does not include
individual data for specially assigned judges. The signed opinions written by those
judges, however, are included in the total number of signed opinions for each fiscal year.
The total average elapsed time for the whole court also incorporates the opinions writ-
ten by those judges. This last inclusion probably substantially decreases the court's
overall elapsed time average. For example, in fiscal year 1990, retired Judge Charles E.
Orth, Jr. was specially assigned to the Court of Appeals for substantial periods of time
from November 1989 through March 1990. According to figures I compiled while on
the Court of Appeals, he filed 16 signed opinions. His average elapsed time from argu-
ment to filing was 52 days.
39. Figures were calculated by using data compiled by the Clerk's Office and ob-
tained in telephone interviews.
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this situation produces is discouraging. 40 For a court that on aver-
age files between 127 and 157 signed opinions in a 12-month pe-
riod, a backlog of 90 unfiled opinions is far from insubstantial.
Enough has been said to show that the Court of Appeals has a
problem with respect to the rate at which opinions are filed. It has
also been shown that the problem is not inherent in the structure of
the court, the size of its workload, or the number of law clerks and
other assistance given the judges. Rather, the problem appears to
lie with the differences in the speed of opinion writing by individual
judges. These differences are too great to be satisfactorily ex-
plained by inherent differences in working speeds, variations in the
difficulty of cases assigned, or similar factors. I concede that differ-
entjudges work at different paces (and within reason, should be al-
lowed to do so), that all cases are not equally difficult, that
reasonable time for research and reflection is required, and that col-
legial focus on each opinion is important. Something is wrong,
however, if during fiscal year 1990, Judge E filed 20 signed opinions
averaging 133 days from argument, but Judge G, with an equal
number of signed opinions, took on average 490 days to file them-
almost four times as long.
II. WHAT Is THE PROBLEM?
One may imagine numerous possible reasons for the excessive
elapsed time between argument and opinion filing in the Court of
Appeals. Some of these are too few law clerks, too little effective
automation, too much time spent on rule-making or other adminis-
trative and policy matters, too many days devoted to arguments, too
many court conferences, and too heavy a workload in general. But
as I have already suggested, any of these reasons, if applicable at all,
would apply equally to all judges. Additionally, assignment of diffi-
cult cases should even out over a period of time. I find it hard to
believe, for example, that for four years Judge C was assigned only
opinions in simple cases, while Judge A was assigned mostly very
tough ones. None of these "reasons" can adequately explain the
disparity in filing times. Rather, that disparity, I submit, arises from
what I shall call "local judicial culture."
40. On September 16, 1986-near the beginning of the 1986 Term-53 opinions
were pending; there were 79 on October 1, 1987; 87 on September 1, 1988; and 90 on
September 15, 1989. Data compiled by author. Until the 1963 Term, the Court of Ap-
peals disposed of all of its argued cases during the term in which they were argued.
MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION 1 (June 24, 1965).
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I derive that term from one frequently cited by scholars at the
National Center for State Courts in their studies of delay at the trial
court level. After looking at many factors that might produce trial
court delay, scholars concluded that one of the most important-
and most pervasive-was the "local legal culture."'" In a nutshell,
"local legal culture" involves the notion that local judges and local
lawyers tend to preserve the status quo to which they have become
accustomed. If, for example, lawyers tend to agree to continuances
as a courtesy to one another, judges are likely to go along, despite
court rules or policies designed to discourage continuances. The
bench and bar reach a frequently tacit understanding on what pace
of litigation is agreeable to them, and it is at this pace that litigation
moves. Not often considered is the interest of litigants, or the gen-
eral public, in having matters move at a particular pace.
I believe that there is a "local judicial culture" that operates
within the Court of Appeals which produces the remarkable varia-
tions in filing patterns that I have discussed. This "culture" may in
part be produced by a misplaced view of judicial independence.
The function of judicial independence is to safeguard each judge's
right to express his or her views on the law without fear of repri-
mand, other than in the course of lawful appellate review, and with-
out danger of personal retaliation or punishment. Thus, it is
appropriate, and indeed essential, that each judge be free to ex-
pound the law as he or she conscientiously understands it. Judicial
independence, however, does not encompass the right of a judge to
be free from all administrative regulations or reasonable time con-
straints on opinion preparation.
But the "culture" of the Court of Appeals seems to embody the
idea that each judge should be allowed to move at his or her own
pace. Despite various efforts made by the Chief Judge,42 peer pres-
sure does not seem to motivate the judges. Those who choose to
write slowly simply will do so. Indeed, peer pressure may scarcely
exist. The court as an institution seems to be comfortable with the
concept that the rate of opinion preparation is a matter to be left to
each individual judge, and is not one with which the collegial court
should be concerned. In short, the court seems to have accepted
41. See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN
URBAN TRIAL COURTS 54 (1978).
42. For example, it has been my experience that the Chief Judge frequently circu-
lates lists of pending opinions by judges, as well as lists of pending opinions about which
inquiry has been made to the Chief Judge or to the Clerk's Office. The name of the
inquirer is never given.
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this hands-off approach to the pace of litigation as an almost inevita-
ble aspect of the way an appellate court operates.
My thesis is not only that dilatory opinion filing is undesirable,
but also that there is nothing in the nature of an appellate court or
proper appellate practice that makes it inevitable. Some of the in-
formation garnered from other states, and summarized in Part I,
supports this latter conclusion. So does the experience of the Court
of Special Appeals.
I understand that comparisons between the Court of Appeals
and the Court of Special Appeals are not always appropriate. There
are real differences in the missions of each court, as well as real dif-
ferences in caseload, case mix, general workload, support staff, and
other matters. Therefore, I do not even begin to suggest that be-
cause the intermediate court disposed of 1355 cases in fiscal year
1990, with an average elapsed time of 28 days from argument to
decision,4" the Court of Appeals should attempt to do likewise.
What I do suggest is that the "judicial culture" of the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals is something that, with considerable benefit, could be
transferred to the Court of Appeals.
During the four years I sat on the Court of Special Appeals,
almost every member of that court was concerned with the pace of
litigation. The court functions with a strong collegial sense of the
importance of moving the caseload-the sort of team spirit that, to
me, is noticeably absent from the Court of Appeals. This commit-
ment to filing opinions in a reasonable time while maintaining the
highest appellate standards feasible is fundamental to the opera-
tions of the Court of Special Appeals. Without it, that court simply
would disappear under an avalanche of unfiled opinions. A similar
approach may not be essential to the Court of Appeals, but, never-
theless, it should be transported there. That, I believe, is the best
solution to the slow opinion-filing problem-a change in the way the
court views this aspect of its work, a change in its "judicial culture."
Even if the court's "judicial culture" changes, however, it is desir-
able to reinforce or institutionalize the new attitude in some way.
III. POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENTS
It is possible, of course, to take various measures in an effort to
expedite opinion filing. For example, Florida court rules require a
decision within 180 days of oral argument or submission.44 The
43. See 1989-1990 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY 35.
44. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.085(d)(2) (1991).
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Georgia Constitution directs the appellate courts of that state to
"dispose of every case at the term for which it is entered on the
court's docket for hearing or at the next term." 45
The Florida provision is not thought of as mandatory, and there
is no penalty for failure to meet the time limit.46 I do not have data
to show how expeditiously the Supreme Court of Florida moves
with respect to the time from submission or argument to opinion
filing. The Georgia time limit does appear to be regarded as
mandatory, even jurisdictional; it is enforced by dismissal of the ap-
peal.47 While this limitation is said to cause "much distress" to
Georgia judges, its rather liberal time requirements, I am told, have
seldom been violated, at least in recent times.48
As I have already observed, the Maryland Constitution sends a
similar message: "[i]n every case an opinion, in writing, shall be
filed within three months after the argument, or submission of the
cause . . . . " This provision of the Maryland Constitution, how-
ever, has been construed as merely directory, not mandatory.5 °
Given the dilemma involved in the enforcement of a provision of
this sort, it is hard to fault this interpretation for its practical effect.
As we have seen, Georgia appears to dismiss an appeal if the time
limit is exceeded, thereby letting the lower court's decision stand.
This seems a harsh penalty for an appellant, who has no way of con-
trolling the speed at which the appellate court moves, yet neverthe-
less suffers for the court's slowness. The alternative, to reverse the
judgment below, is even worse. A blameless appellee is punished
45. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, 2. There are three appellate terms in Georgia, begin-
ning in January, April, and September of each year. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-4(b)(c)
(Michie 1990); see also GA. SuP. CT. R. 6.
46. Telephone Interview with Maribeth Hudson, Court Services Manager, Florida
State Courts Administrator's Office (Oct. 17, 1991).
47. See Dixie Realty Finance Co. v. Morgan, 155 S.E. 468, 468 (Ga. 1936) (transmittal
of case delayed by clerk of lower court; case dismissed by supreme court for lack of
jurisdiction because it could not be decided within the requisite period); see also Brown v.
State, 223 S.E.2d 642, 642 (Ga. 1976) (if case not decided within statutory period, lower
court's opinion is affirmed); Davis v. Davis, 151 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ga. 1966) (court will
not consider state appeal caused by appellant's delay).
48. Letter from Robert L. Doss, Jr., Director, Judicial Council of Georgia, Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts, to author (May 11, 1990). Mr. Doss advised in a subsequent
letter in April 1991 that he has "always considered it a stroke of luck that [Georgia has]
had the two-term rule." Letter from Robert L. Doss, Jr., Director, Judicial Council of
Georgia, Administrative Office of the Courts, to author (Apr. 4, 1991). I believe this
indicates that the provision imposes some time limits (albeit rather broad ones) as to
when an opinion must be filed.
49. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 15.
50. See McCall's Ferry Power Co. v. Price, 108 Md. 96, 113, 69 A. 832, 838 (1908).
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for the court's delay when a lower court's decision is stricken, not
because of judicial error in that court, but because the appellate
court is dilatory.
Perhaps to avoid the unfairness apparent in either of these re-
sults, some states have attempted to focus on laggard appellate
judges. Alaska law, for instance, warns that
[a] salary warrant may not be issued to a justice of the
supreme court until the justice has filed with the state of-
ficer designated to issue salary warrants an affidavit that no
matter referred to the justice for opinion or decision has
been uncompleted or undecided by the justice for a period
of more than six months.'
This is interpreted to require each justice to whom an opinion has
been assigned to circulate a draft of that opinion within the statutory
time period.12
By the same token, the California Constitution provided, until
1966, that:
No justice of the Supreme Court nor of a District Court of
Appeals, nor any judge of a superior court nor of a munici-
pal court shall draw or receive any monthly salary unless he
shall make and subscribe an affidavit . . . that no cause in
his court remains pending and undetermined that has been
submitted for decision for a period of 90 days.53
Section 19, replacing section 24 in California's amended constitu-
tion, now reads:
A judge of a court of record may not receive the salary
for the judicial office held by the judge while any cause
before the judge remains pending and undetermined for
90 days after it has been submitted for decision.54
Alaska, as we have seen,55 is a rather expeditious court within
our frame of reference. I do not know whether California is equally
expeditious. In any event, in a society that gives at least lip service
to the effectiveness of market forces, there is something to be said
for the notion of a fiscal incentive for judicial celerity. I do not be-
lieve, however, that the salary sanction is the best way to address the
problem of judicial delay. Aside from the fact that in Maryland it
51. ALAsKA STAT. § 22.05.140(b) (1990).
52. ALAsKA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK 30 (1988).
53. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (repealed 1966).
54. Id. § 19.
55. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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probably would have to be authorized by constitutional amend-
ment,56 such a drastic measure may well have an adverse effect on
due deliberation. Furthermore, such a provision is certain to pro-
duce debate about its precise meaning and thrust, and, perhaps,
cumbersome procedures for its administration. There are those
cases which, for good reasons, may not be properly determinable
within a period fixed by law. Exceptions to the rule are inevitable
and the exceptions are soon likely to swallow the rule.
Moreover, the most effective way of encouraging reasonable ex-
pedition in the filing of appellate opinions is to adopt a procedure
that the judges themselves endorse, as opposed to one that is forced
upon them from the outside. The adoption by the courts of rules or
guidelines looking to speed up opinion filing is in fact widespread.
In Alaska, for example, which has a statutory time limit, 57 the
justices of the supreme court have adopted an internal operating
procedure that cuts the statutory time limits in half.58 The spirit
that fostered the adoption of this policy is more likely the cause of
Alaska's relatively speedy filing than is the salary sanction statute.
California, in similar fashion, has ended controversy surrounding its
constitutional salary sanction by adopting a policy of filing opinions
within ninety days of oral argument.59 The Chief Justice of Califor-
nia recently announced that the policy "has been successful, and we
have met our goal in all cases thus far."'
Comparable provisions, adopted by rule or otherwise, exist or
are being adopted in a number ofjurisdictions. The Supreme Court
of Alabama has adopted the American Bar Association time stan-
dards for handling appeals. 6' Hawaii's Supreme Court Rule 9 calls
for an opinion within twelve months after oral argument, although
in fact opinions usually are filed much more quickly.62 Idaho has
56. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14. The salary of a judge of the Court of Appeals "shall
not be diminished during his continuance in office." Id.
57. See ALAsKA STAT. § 22.05.140(b) (1990).
58. Thejustice to whom an opinion is assigned must circulate a draft opinion within
90 days of oral argument or submission. ALASKA SUPREME COURT ATrORNEY'S HAND-
BOOK 30 (1988).
59. See Philip Carrizosa, State High Court Agrees to Decide Cases in 90 Days, L.A. DAILYJ.,
Sept. 18, 1988, at 1.
60. Malcom M. Lewis, State Judiciary News: California, STATE CT. J., Winter 1991, at
39.
61. See Sonny Hornsby, State Judiciary News: Alabama, STATE CT. J., Summer 1990, at
46; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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adopted a ninety-day guideline.6" Louisiana has developed guide-
lines that apparently produce an opinion within about six weeks of
argument.' Massachusetts has a standard of 130 days.65
The New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure are particularly
instructive:
A. The timely disposition of appeals is an essential
requirement of justice. In any appeal or other case pend-
ing before the supreme court or court of appeals, the ap-
pellate court . . . should render a decision or otherwise
dispose of the case within ten.., months of the date of the
filing of the notice of appeal. In any event, a decision shall
be rendered within three.., months of the date of submis-
sion to a panel or the full court.
[B. If that is not done, a statement of reasons for the
noncompliance must be filed within a month of the due
date, and monthly thereafter.]
C. If any appeal is pending before the supreme court
or the court of appeals for more than two . . . months be-
yond the applicable deadline, the case shall be given prior-
ity by the court.66
It is noteworthy that New Mexico appears to be one of the more
rapid courts in opinion filing.67
North Carolina lacks any constitutional provision, statute, or
court rule controlling the time within which opinions must be filed.
But the justices have adopted an unpublished policy under which
they ordinarily circulate drafts of written opinions within 60 days
after argument. 68 The supreme court of that state also files opin-
ions with considerable speed.69 Tennessee also is without a formal
limiting provision. I am informed, however, that if a justice is too
slow in opinion writing, the chiefjustice will call him or her, take the
record back, and have the case reargued. This is said to cause con-
siderable embarrassment, but we have no data to show what effect in
63. Letter from Carl F. Bianchi, Administrative Director of the Courts, State of
Idaho, to author (Apr. 24, 1990).
64. Letter from Timothy F. Averill, Deputy Judicial Administrator, Louisiana
Supreme Court, to author (June 11, 1990).
65. Letter from Hon. Arthur M. Mason, Chief Administrative Justice, Common-
wealth of Massachusetts Trial Courts, to author (May 29, 1990).
66. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-406 (Michie Supp. 1991).
67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
68. Letter from Franklin Freeman, Jr., Director, Administrative Office of the Courts
of North Carolina, to author (May 22, 1990).
69. Id.
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promoting promptness the procedure may have.7 °
In recent years Virginia has adopted stringent measures to re-
duce appellate backlog, among them the acceptance by each
supreme court justice of a twenty percent increase in opinion-writ-
ing assignments. This effort has been quite successful. 71 With re-
spect to our particular concerns, the court has itself adopted the
goal of disposing of all matters within twelve months of the filing of
the petition for appeal. As earlier noted, the Virginia court files
opinions within approximately six weeks (forty-five days) after
argument. 72
This perhaps cursory survey shows three general approaches to
reducing time lapse from argument or submission to opinion filing:
a constitutional, statutory, or rule provision that is sometimes read
as mandatory; a salary sanction; and a rule, guideline, or policy posi-
tion adopted by the court itself.73 For reasons I have already given,
the first two "remedies" seem to have drawbacks that exceed their
possible benefits. The third, however, has the advantage of always
being the voluntary product of the court that adopts it. It therefore
represents a statement of what the "local judicial culture" will toler-
ate as far as delay is concerned. Such a statement, made public by
the judges themselves, should weigh heavily with the judges and
produce the kind of peer pressure needed to make it effective, thus
helping a chief judge in his efforts to move along dilatory col-
leagues. Equally as important, rules like those of Hawaii and New
Mexico, and policies or guidelines like those adopted in Alaska and
other states, leave sufficient flexibility to allow for the occasional
case in which substantial delay may be appropriate, and they do so
without adding the burden of major administrative complexity.74
70. Telephone Interview with Cletus McWilliams, Tennessee Supreme Court Execu-
tive Secretary (May 29, 1990).
71. Letter from Robert M. Baldwin, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court of Virginia,
to author (Apr. 27, 1990).
72. See supra text accompanying note 30.
73. Another possible approach would be to refer a persistently dilatory judge to the
appropriate judicial disciplinary agency. In Maryland, the Commission on Judicial Disa-
bilities may recommend and the Court of Appeals may take disciplinary action upon "a
finding of ... failure to perform the duties of [a judge's] office or of conduct prejudicial
to the proper administration of justice .... " MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(b). Arguably,
these provisions might apply to a particularly persistent and egregious failure to prepare
opinions in a timely fashion. But the disciplinary mechanism, for a variety of obvious
reasons, is a last-resort measure and is available only in an extreme case. It is not a
useful means of establishing or enforcing day-to-day opinion-filing standards.
74. There are, as virtually all standards and policies recognize, cases of seriousness
and complexity that require extraordinary time for proper disposition. On other occa-
sions, prudent delay may be required pending a relevant United States Supreme Court
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IV. AN OPINION-FILING POLICY FOR MARYLAND
If judicially adopted time limits for opinion filing can work, as
they seem to, in a number of our sister states, they can also work in
Maryland. It is, as I remarked at the outset, a question of will. The
judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland should solve the ex-
isting delay problem by adopting and abiding by a reasonable time-
limit policy. The policy should have a degree of flexibility, but it
should be clearly understood that its time limits represent the norm
and that deviations will be tolerated only in the rare and truly excep-
tional cases. Moreover, the policy, like that of New Mexico and sev-
eral other states, should be adopted by rule. It would thus be a
statement by the court of its own position, yet a public one, promul-
gated with the effect of law in the course of the court's rule-making
power.75
The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
contains drafters much more competent than I, so I shall not ven-
ture to propose the text of a time-limit rule.76 I shall suggest, how-
ever, what sort of time limits should be imposed.
To avoid undue shock at the outset, I propose that each judge
to whom an opinion is assigned ordinarily be required to circulate a
draft within sixty days of argument or submission; that a dissent or-
dinarily be circulated within thirty days of the conference at which
the draft opinion is first considered; and that the opinion ordinarily
be filed within 120 days of argument in most cases and within 180
days in the more difficult ones. Although the 180 day "outside"
time limit somewhat exceeds the ABA's maximum, this proposal is
generally consistent with the ABA standards.77
decision or potential legislative action. But the fact that exceptions to expeditious filing
policy do and should exist does not lessen the need for, or desirability of, such a policy.
75. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a). In addition, if the court adopted an appropriate
timely-filing rule, it would help to delineate one of the duties of a Court of Appeals
judge's office for judicial disciplinary purposes. See supra note 73.
76. The New Mexico rule might afford a promising beginning. See supra text accom-
panying note 27. In addition to the ABA time standards, see supra note 35; infra note 77
and accompanying text, attention might well be directed to forthcoming formulations of
appellate court standards. For example, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Con-
ference of State Court Administrators recently urged the National Center for State
Courts to undertake such a project. See State Court Leaders Hold Annual Meetings, NAT'L
CENTER FOR ST. CTs. REP. (Nat'l Center for St. Cts., Williamsburg, Va.), Sept. 1991, at 1,
3.
77. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. ABA standards in general call for prep-
aration of opinions within 60 days from argument or submission (90 days in death pen-
alty cases and cases of extraordinary complexity); circulation of dissents within 30 days
of circulation of the opinion; and additional processing time of 30 days. See AMERICAN
BAR AsSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY REDUCTION § 3.55(b)(3)-
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Moreover, I would have the Court of Appeals adopt procedures
to enhance public accountability for its performance pqrsuant to
these standards. The AOC statistics are helpful, but I would also
cause to be printed in the Maryland Reports and the Atlantic Re-
porter the date of argument or submission of each case, in addition
to the presently published date of filing. Perhaps the court itself, if
it adopted standards like those I suggest, would also adopt even
more effective ways of publicizing its compliance with them.
The adoption of and conscientious adherence to these stan-
dards would not necessarily place the Court of Appeals among the
most rapid of state appellate courts. It would, however, materially
diminish the time from argument or submission to opinion filing.7"
Since the time frames I propose are not averages, but maximums,
the court's average filing time should be considerably better than
the 160 days recorded for fiscal year 1987.79
Even if the Court of Appeals operated so that its average
elapsed times were consistent with the proposed standards, there
would be a remarkable improvement. And once that level of per-
formance had been achieved, it would be time to consider whether
to go to the ABA's 120 to 150 day maximum, or perhaps even
further.
It clearly is feasible to achieve a rate of productivity that would
result in average elapsed time consistent with the proposed stan-
dards. As Table 2 demonstrates, three (Judges C, E, and I) of the
six judges who were on the court for the four fiscal years under
study, for the most part, did exactly that. ° If they could accomplish
this, why not all the members of the court? The answer, I submit, is
that the court could if it would.
Perhaps some reflection on the adverse effects of undue delay
in opinion filing and on the way in which other courts have coped
with this problem will induce the Court of Appeals of Maryland to
make the necessary effort to remedy the situation. It is a problem
that can best, perhaps only, be solved by an exercise of the court's
collegial will. If the court would, it could solve its opinion-filing de-
lay problem.
(5) (1988). Thus, the ABA maximum is 150 days. I would allow a little more flexibility
for dissents and extend the maximum to 180 days (perhaps over-generously) to give
breathing room for especially difficult cases.
78. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
79. See supra Table 1. Fiscal year 1987 had the shortest average time reported for the
four fiscal years studied here.
80. The only exception is Judge I in fiscal year 1989.
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